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BID DEPOSITORIES 
George H. Schueller* 
THE decision by the United States District Court for the South-ern District of California in the civil antitrust case of 
United States v. Bakersfield Associated Plumbing Contractors, Inc.1 
brought in its wake considerable renewed interest, discussion, and 
activities concerning "bid depositories." This is apparent from 
the trade press2 and from inquiries reaching the Antitrust Division, 
including a number of requests fo:r clearance of bid depository 
plans through so-called "railroad release" procedures. Even more 
recently, institution of the civil and criminal antitrust cases of 
United States v. Arizona Masonry and Plastering Contractors' 
Association provided further stimulation.3 The term "renewed" 
interest and activities is used because interest and activities in this 
field had been vivid from the time of demise of the NRA codes4 
until the pre-war years. Perhaps, that interest continued all along, 
and only the activities subsided because of the institution, around 
1940, of numerous antitrust actions involving bid depositories.IS 
Has the Bakersfield decision given a new lease on life to bid 
depositories? 
• Assistant Chief, Trial Section, Antitrust Division, Department of Justice. The 
opinions expressed herein are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views 
of the Department of Justice.-Ed. 
1 S.D. Cal., Civ. No. 1479-ND, 1958 TRADE CAs. iJ69,087, final judgment by Jertberg, J., 
dated May 26, 1958, modified final judgment by Yankwich, J., dated Dec. 22, 1958, 1959 
TRADE CAS. ff69, 266. 
2 See Glassie, "The Legal Line," QUALIFIED CONTRACTOR, Oct. 1958, p. 77; Glassie, 
"Bidding Plan Cleared," QUALIFIED CONTRACTOR, Dec. 1958, p. 104; Lamb, "Danger Still 
Lurks in Bid Depositories," PLUMBING AND HEATING BUSINESS, Feb. 1959, p. 7; "New Opti-
mism vs. New Trouble," PLUMBING AND HEATING BUSINESS, July 1959, p. 77. 
3 D.C. Ariz., Crim. No. C-15290, indictment returned June 2, 1959; and D.C. Ariz., Civ. 
No. 3066-PHX, complaint filed June 2, 1959. See comment in PLUMBING AND HEATING 
BUSINESS, July 1959, p. 7. 
4 Schechter Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935). See Joint Hearing Before the 
Subcommittees of the Committees on the Judiciary on S. 848 and Similar House Bills, 83d 
Cong., 1st sess., pp. 23-24 (1953); S. Hearings Before a Subcommittee of the Committee on 
the Judiciary on S. 1644, 84th Cong., 1st sess., pp. 159-160 (1955). 
IS See cases cited and discussed infra. 
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Before discussing the details of that judgment, it will be well, 
first, to describe the commercial problems and issues which lie be-
hind the phenomenon of "bid depositories." We then shall review 
the past twenty or so years' experiences with those problems in the 
Congress of the United States, in the Antitrust Division, and in the 
federal courts. Such a historical background will help in evalua-
tion of the Bakersfield judgment and in reaching conclusions. 
I. Bm DEPOSITORIE;,S, Bm SHOPPING, AND Bm PEDDLING 
"Bid depository" is not a technical term. There are about as 
many types of bid depositories as there are groups creating them. 
Basically, it is a facility, created and operated by a trade association 
or by an independent agency, such as a bank, which collects bids 
for the sale and installation of construction supplies from sub-
contractors to general contractors. Such bids or copies of bids on 
any given job for which bids have been invited are to be sent to 
the depository a short time prior to the date set by the general 
contractor or awarding authority for the opening and award of the 
subcontracts. The depository keeps the subcontractors' bids closed 
and confidential until just before or just after the hour of the bid 
opening by the general contractor. It then opens and tabulates 
those bids, making the bid quotations known to all subcontractors 
participating in the depository and, sometimes, to other interested 
parties. Once deposited, bids usually may not be withdrawn, or 
may be withdrawn only under penalty of certain fines. Admin-
istrative costs of the depository are covered by fees collected from 
successful bidders. To facilitate compilation of the subcontractors' 
bids, special bid forms sometimes are provided. 
The principal function of bid depositories is the inhibition of 
so-called "bid peddling" and "bid shopping" practices.6 Since 
depositories require participating subcontractors to file definitive 
subbids prior to the general contractors' opening of those bids, 
there is little chance for last-minute haggling. Further, since any 
6 In trade circles, those terms are understood to mean offers, requests, and negotiations 
for contracts at prices lower than those quoted in bids submitted in response to the original 
invitation. If the initiative is taken by the firm which would perform the work, it is called 
"bid peddling"; if by the agency or firm for which the work is to be done, it is called "bid 
shopping." Of course, it takes both parties to agree on work to be performed at a cut 
price. See Report of the Federal Trade Commission, dated May 20, 1952, in S. Hearings 
Before a Subcommittee of the Committee on the Judiciary on S. 2907, 82d Cong., 2d sess., 
pp. 274-275 (1952); S. Rep. 617, to accompany S. 1644, 84th Cong., 1st sess., p. 6 (1955); 
H. Rep. 434, to accompany H.R. 7168, 85th Cong., 1st sess., p. 5 (1957). 
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discrepancies between the filed bid quotations of participating sub-
contractors and the prices ultimately charged by any of them are 
likely to be detected, post-award bid shopping among depository 
members is also inhibited. And if the general contractor awards 
the job to a subcontractor who had not filed a bid with the de-
pository, the unsuccessful subcontractors may infer that he had 
used their bids for "shopping" and refrain from competing for his 
business in the future. Another function of bid depositories is to 
serve as a convenient agency from which general contractors can 
obtain a maximum number of subbids. 
Bid shopping and bid peddling has long been frowned upon 
and marked as an "unethical practice" by some organizations of 
interested trades.7 A series of reasons for condemning those prac-
tices has been advanced. (a) The preparation of a bid involves 
the time and costs necessary to analyze the job, to estimate the 
price of required materials and labor, and to calculate the bid 
quotation in the light of those factors and of the competitive situa-
tion. Parties who engaged in bid peddling or shopping may use 
such bid quotations prepared by others for bargaining purposes, 
without going to the trouble of preparing their own, independent 
calculations. Hence, bid peddling and bid shopping are said to 
increase the risk that the contractor who actually prepared a bid 
may lose his investment therein.8 (b) General contractors are in-
terested in obtaining subbids timely enough to prepare their own 
bids to the awarding authority on the basis of the best subbid 
available. However, in many instances when bid shopping is 
feared, general contractors are said to be handicapped in preparing 
their bids by delays in the submission of subbids. For "[every sub-
contractor] holds his bid until the last minute so there will be no 
time for [bid] shopping."9 (c) There is evidence that some sub-
contractors refrain from submitting bids for jobs on which they 
anticipate bid shopping. To that extent, competition among sub-
7 AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF ARCHITECTS, HANDBOOK OF ARCHITECTURAL PRACI"ICE, Bk. III, 
p. 702 (1958); CODE OF ETHICS OF THE AssoCIATED GENERAL CONTRACTORS OF AMERICA, §3. 
s Even in the absence of bid shopping, of course, he has no assurance that his bid will 
be successful and, in case of subbids, that the general contractor to whom he submits his 
bid will be the successful bidder. 
9 Joint Hearings Before the Subcommittees of the Committees on the Judiciary on S. 
848 and Similar House Bills, 83d Cong., 1st sess., p. 23 (1953). This applies of course only 
to bid shopping prior to the final award of the general contract. See also S. Hearings Be-
fore a Subcommittee of the Committee on the Judiciary on S. 1644, 84th Cong., 1st sess., 
pp. 81, 90, lll, 112 (1955). 
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contractors is diminished.10 ( d) If bid shopping is expected by 
the subcontractors, they may pad their bids to allow for reductions 
in the course of further negotiations. Hence, it has been said, bid · 
shopping tends to make bids too high.11 (e) After the general 
contract has been awarded, the successful general contractor has 
strong bargaining powers. Prior to the award the pressure upon 
general contractors and subcontractors is about equal, and the 
plurality of competing general contractors tends to diffuse their 
power over subcontractors. With the general contract in his 
pocket, however, the general contractor has something to give to a 
subcontractor willing to settle for less than the lowest subbid.12 
(f) Situations may arise in which a prime contractor submits his 
bid to the awarding authority on the basis of subbids received by 
him, obtains the general contract on that basis, then succeeds 
through bid shopping or bid peddling in having the subcontrac-
tor's work done at a reduced price. Such a price reduction may 
create a windfall profit for the prime contractor, instead of a 
savings for the awarding authority or owner.13 Those are the 
principal arguments adduced by parties interested in condemning 
and suppressing bid shopping and bid peddling. However, as it 
will be pointed out below, there is another side. 
From the records of the Congress14 it is clear that the parties 
most strongly interested in creating bid depositories and in elimi-
nating bid peddling are those connected with the mechanical 
10 This was the main argument advanced in favor of enactment of a Federal Construc-
tion Contract Act. See S. Rep. 448, accompanying S. 848, 83d Cong., 1st sess., p. 2 (1953); 
H. Rep. 892, accompanying H.R. 1825, 83d Cong., 1st sess., p. 4 (1953); S. Rep. 617, accom-
panying S. 1644, 84th Cong., 1st sess., p. 3 (1955); H. Rep. 2362, accompanying S. 1644, 84th 
Cong., 2d sess., p. 3 (1956); S. Rep. 1119, accompanying H.R. 7168, 85th Cong., 1st sess., 
p. 7 (1957); H. Rep. 434, accompanying H.R. 7168, 85th Cong., 1st sess., p. 5 (1957). 
11 H. Rep. 434, accompanying H.R. 7168, 85th Cong., 1st sess., p. 5 (1957). Cf. Ring 
Constr. Corp. v. Secretary of War, 8 T.C. 1070 at 1075, 1089 (1947). 
12 " ••• while bid-shopping prior to the award may be unethical, at that time prime 
bidders and the sub-bidders are substantially on the same footing. After the award the 
situation is not equal. ... " S. Rep. 617, accompanying S. 1644, 84th Cong., 1st sess., p. 6 
(1955). In the S. Hearings Before a Subcommittee of the Committee on the Judiciary on 
S. 1644, 84th Cong., 1st sess., p. 206 (1955), a witness stated: " ... it is not the same eco-
nomic problem. Before the award of the contract, the subcontractors and the prime 
contractors stand on an equal footing in that the prime contractor still needs the subbids. 
After the award, the prime contractor has a monopoly, and such a practice is a clear 
unfair trade practice, more than a matter of ethics." A witness in the Joint Hearing 
Before the Subcommittees of the Committees on the Judiciary on S. 848 and Similar House 
Bills, 83d Cong., 1st sess., p. 23 (1953), said: " ... after he gets the contract, he can say to 
the subcontractors, 'You can do business my way, or we won't do business at all.'" 
13 Cf. Ring Constr. Corp. v. Secretary of War, 8 T.C. 1070 (1947). 
14 All Federal Construction Contract bills, discussed infra, were advocated primarily 
by electrical, plumbing, and sheet metal contractors' groups. The Bakersfield case itself, 
typically, involved plumbing, sheet metal, and electrical contractors' associations. Cf. also 
numerous other antitrust cases involving bid depositories, cited and discussed infra. 
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specialty contractors' trade, i.e., electrical, plumbing, and sheet 
metal contractors.15 Members of those trades usually participate 
in building projects as subcontractors, submitting their bids to 
general contractors, although that procedure is by no means uni-
versally followed.16 Members of the non-mechanical specialty con-
tractors' trades, such as masons, bricklayers, floor layers, roofers, 
lathers, etc., also function as subcontractors and sometimes create 
bid depositories.17 Presumably, all those subcontractor groups 
occasionally experience "bid shopping" by general contractors, and 
some non-mechanical specialty subcontractors might disagree with 
a Senate Report which stated: 
"This condition [bid shopping] does not appear to exist to the 
same significant degree outside the mechanical specialty con-
tracting field because normally the general contractor does 
not find it necessary to procure subbids for work other than 
mechanical specialty work .... "18 
There may be, however, a general difference between the me-
chanical and the non-mechanical groups when it comes to dealing 
with general contractors or awarding authorities. It has often 
been said that the preparation of bids for mechanical work is more 
costly than the preparation of non-mechanical bids and that, 
therefore, the awarding of contracts to firms which may not even 
have troubled to prepare a bid is more unfair and damaging to 
mechanical than to non-mechanical contractors.19 
15 S. 1644, 84th Cong., 2d sess. (1956), §3 (3), contained the following definition: "The 
term 'mechanical specialty work' in connection with a construction contract means all 
plumbing, heating, piping, air conditioning, refrigerating, ventilating, and electrical work, 
including but not limited to the furnishing and installation of sewer, drainage and water 
supply piping and plumbing, heating, piping, air conditioning, refrigerating, ventilating 
and electrical materials, equipment and fixtures." 
16 See "Memorandum on Procedures, etc." submitted on behalf of the National Elec-
trical Contractors' Association and inserted as Appendix to S. Hearings Before a Sub-
committee of the Committee on the Judiciary on S. 1644, 84th Cong., 1st sess., p. 223 (1955). 
17 See the Arizona cases, cited note 3 supra, and cases involving tile contractors, marble 
contractors, mason contractors, plasterers, cited infra. 
18 S. Rep. 617, Federal Construction Contract Act, 84th Cong., 1st sess., p. IO (1955). 
19 "Estimating with regard to these specialties is an expensive process, requiring highly 
trained technicians to estimate the cost of various mechanical specialty work. This expen-
sive process, however, is not the case in calculating and assembling the cost of brickwork, 
plastering, excavation, etc., each of which can be figured accurately on a mathematical 
basis." [H. Rep. 434, 85th Cong., 1st sess., p. IO (1957)]. See also S. Rep. 448, 83d Cong., 
1st sess., p. 6 (1953); H. Rep. 892, 83d Cong., 1st sess., p. 8 (1953); S. Rep. 617, 84th Cong., 
1st sess., p. IO (1955); H. Rep. 2362, 84th Cong., 2d sess., p. 7 (1956); S. Hearings Before a 
Subcommittee of the Committee on the Judiciary on S. 2907, 82d Cong., 2d sess., p. 74 
(1952). But d. H. Hearings Before Subcommittee No. 2 of the Committee on the Judiciary 
on S. 1644 and Similar House Bills, 84th Cong., 2d sess., p. 158 (1956); S. Hearings on S. 
2907, supra, at p. 278; Joint Hearing Before the Subcommittees of the Committees on the 
Judiciary on S. 848 and Similar House Bills, 83d Cong., 1st sess., p. 168 (1953). 
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Bid shopping and bid peddling, although condemned as "un-
ethical practices" by the canons of some trade organizations,20 are 
nevertheless forms of vigorous price competition and, as such, 
supported by national antitrust policies and statutes. Any efforts 
to suppress or prevent those practices must come to grips with that 
fact. Such efforts have been made, it seems, mainly along the 
following approaches, each of which has its limitation: (1) 
through persuasion and education among members of interested 
groups, including the canons against "unethical practices" re-
ferred to above; (2) through statutes requiring either that specialty 
work be bid separately and directly to the awarding authorities or 
that the prime contractor name the specialty subcontractors on 
whose subbids his bid is based and whom he will use;21 and (3) 
through the organization of bid depositories. Education and 
ethics, however, vary with the individuals concerned; and penaliz-
ing violations un~er a "code of ethics" which restricts price com-
petition may be unlawful. A spokesman for the mechanical 
specialty contractors said: 
"No sanctions on a violator of a code of ethics are permitted 
under our antitrust laws.· The Antitrust Division has been 
more than active in every case in which any such effort has 
been made, to enforce or even persuade contractors that they 
must bid in a certain way .... We would love to cooperate, 
but we are not interested in going to jail. ... "22 
As far as statutes are concerned, a few states have enacted legisla-
tion requiring prime contractors to specify the names of their sub-
contractors and the work to be performed by the latter.23 Since 
consent of the awarding authority is required for a change in sub-
contractors, bid shopping and bid peddling is inhibited to some 
degree. However, those statutes govern the award of certain types 
of public construction contracts only, and they restrict bid shop-
ping and bid peddling only after award of such contracts.24 One 
20 See note 7 supra. 
21 Cal. Govt. Code (Deering, 1958) §4104; Mass. Laws Ann. (1957; Supp. 1959) c. 149, 
§§44A-44D; N.J. Stat. Ann. (1955) tit. 52, §32-2; 55 N.Y. Consol. Laws (McKinney, 1940) 
§135; N.C. Gen. Stat. (1958 rep!.) §143-128; Ohio Rev. Code (Page, 1953) tit. 1, §153.50; 
Pa. Stat. Ann. (Purdon, 1957) tit. 53, §1003. 
22 Testimony by Mr. Henry H. Glassie at S. Hearings Before a Subcommittee of the 
Committee on the Judiciary on S. 1644, 84th Cong., 1st sess., p. 208 (1955). 
23 See note 21 supra. 
24 They also fail to· restrict bid peddling between subcontractors and their sub-sub-
contractors, materialmen and suppliers. Cf. S. Hearings Before a Subcommittee of the 
Committee on the Judiciary on S. 1644, 84th Cong., 1st sess., p. 113 (1955); H. Hearings 
Before Subcommittee No. 2 of the Committee on the Judiciary on H.R. 3241, H.R. 3339, 
H.R. 3340, H.R. 3810, H.R. 4313, 85th Cong., 1st sess., p. 117 (1957). 
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prominent general contractor, discussing such a statute, publicly 
expressed the view that "it has not accomplished a solitary thing."25 
The third approach to restricting bid shopping and peddling, 
namely, bid depositories, may appear to be the most effective. They 
also are subject to limitations and pitfalls, on which the further 
discussions herein are intended to shed some light. 
II. BILLS AGAINST BID SHOPPING IN THE CONGRESS AND 
.ARGUMENTS IN DEFENSE OF BID SHOPPING 
In the Congress of the United States, the fight against bid shop-
ping and peddling has been connected, for more than twenty 
years, with attempts-so far fruitless-to pass a Federal Construc-
tion Contract Act or a Federal Construction Contract Procedures 
Act.26 While the primary purpose of the various proposed bills 
was to improve government construction procedures and to get the 
most for the taxpayers' money, the acknowledged secondary pur-
pose was to prevent bid shopping and peddling.27 Discussion of 
the provisions of each of the bills in question falls outside the scope 
of this paper. Suffice it to say that, among other things, they all 
required prime contractors to name in their bids the mechanical 
specialty subcontractors to be used on the given job, after the 
pattern of the state statutes mentioned above. Those bills were 
strongly advocated by representatives of mechanical specialty con-
tractors and opposed by general contractors.28 The federal agencies 
most directly concerned with construction also took a negative 
attitude toward those bills, mainly for fear of administrative com-
25 Mr. R. A. Smith, Los Angeles, referring to the California statute in S. Hearings 
Before a Subcommittee of the Committee on the Judiciary on S. 1644, 84th Cong., 1st 
sess., p. 176 (1955). The California statute is reprinted at p. 263. 
26 For detailed statements of legislative history, see H. Hearings Before Subcommittee 
No. 2 of the Committee on the Judiciary on H.R. 3241, H.R. 3339, H.R. 3340, H.R. 3810, 
H.R. 4313, 85th Cong., 1st sess., pp. 98, 99, ll6, ll7 (1957); S. Rep. lll9, accompanying 
H.R. 7168, 85th Cong., 1st sess., pp. 2, 3 (1957). 
27 See, e.g., the statement by Senator Kilgore, Chairman: "The primary purpose of 
the proposed legislation is to effect a procedure under which Federal works may be erected 
at the lowest possible cost and under which prime contractors and subcontractors alike 
will be protected against the unfair trade practice of bid shopping." S. Hearings Before 
a Subcommittee of the Committee on the Judiciary on S. 1644, 84th Cong., 1st sess., p. 3 
(1955). In S. Hearings Before a Subcommittee of the Committee on the Judiciary on S. 
2907, 82d Cong., 2d sess., p. 8 (1952), Senator Sparkman, a sponsor of the bill, stated: "Sec• 
tion 3 of the bill is designed to abolish the practice of bid shopping." See also the report of 
the Comptroller General, id. at 271. 
28 "There has always been a fight by general contractors every time one of these bills 
has been submitted." [Senator Kilgore, Chairman, in S. Hearings on S. 1644, cited in note 
27 supra, at p. 196] However, in Marcil 1957, the 38th annual convention of the Asso• 
ciated General Contractors of America resolved not to object to the principles stated in 
five bills then pending in the House, whicll were companions to S. 7168. [S. Rep. lll9, 
85th Cong., 1st sess., p. 3 (1957)]. 
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plications, increased expenses, and legal entanglements.29 The 
Department of Justice repeatedly took the position that those bills 
represented a policy matter for Congress to decide, and that it 
preferred to make no recommendation.so 
As early as 1932, such bills were introduced in the 72d Con-
gress; there were hearings and a favorable House Report, but no 
action.a1 The 75th Congress passed a similar bill in 1938; how-
ever, it was vetoed by the President:a2 
"While I recognize the evils of 'bid-shopping' and favor any 
provision which will promote the prompt payment of the 
obligations of contractors for labor and materials, it is be-
lieved that this bill will have no tendency to accomplish either 
of its objects and will merely create a multitude of adminis-
trative difficulties .... " 
Of the bills introduced in subsequent Congresses, S. 1644 in the 
84th Congress came close to enactment. It passed the Senate but 
failed in the House. Again, in the 85th Congress, H.R. 7168 
passed the House on voice vote, but the corresponding Senate Bill 
S. 2300 failed of passage.as 
In various committee hearings on those bills, the pros and cons 
of bid shopping and bid peddling were discussed. The principal 
evils attributed to such practices have been described above. 
There follow some of the factual contentions on the other side. (a) 
29 See, e.g., S. Hearings Before a Subcommittee of the Committee on the Judiciary on 
S. 2907, 82d Cong., 2d sess. (1952), containing adverse recommendations from the Depart-
ments of Defense, Interior, General Services Administration, Atomic Energy Commission, 
and the Comptroller General; Joint Hearing Before the Subcommittees of the Committees 
on the Judiciary on S. 848, 83d Cong., 1st sess. (1953), containing adverse recommenda-
tions from the Secretary of the Army, General Services Administration, Atomic Energy Com-
mission, and General Accounting Office; S. Hearings Before a Subcommittee of the Com-
mittee on the Judiciary on S. 1644, 84th Cong., 1st sess. (1955), containing adverse recom-
mendations from the Department of Defense, Atomic Energy Commission, and General 
Services Administration; H. Hearings Before a Subcommittee No. 2 of the Committee on 
the Judiciary on S. 1644, H.R. 7637, H.R. 7638, H.R. 7668, H.R. 7676, H.R. 7686, H.R. 
7693, 84th Cong., 2d sess. (1955), containing adverse recommendations from General Serv-
ices Administration, Comptroller General, Atomic Energy Commission, Departments of 
the Army and of the Interior; H. Hearings Before Subcommittee No. 2 of the Committee 
on the Judiciary on H.R. 3241, H.R. 3339, H.R. 3340, H.R. 3810, H.R. 4313, 85th Cong., 
1st sess. (1957), containing negative recommendations from the Departments of the Army 
and of the Interior, General Services Administration, and Atomic Energy Commission. 
30 See Deputy Attorney General Rogers' letter to the Chairman, dated May 15, 1957, in 
H. Hearings Before Subcommittee No. 2 of the Committee on the Judiciary on H.R. 3241, 
etc., 85th Cong., 1st sess., p. 95 (1957); and letters from the Department of Justice con-
tained in other Hearings, cited in note 29 supra. 
31 H.R. 4680, H.R. 9921; S. 4081, S. 1639. H. Rep. 1272 on H.R. 9921, 72d Cong., 1st 
sess. (1933). 
32 H.R. 146. Veto message of June 25, 1938, contained in 83 CONG. REc. 9707-9708 
(1938). 
33See S. Rep. 1119, accompanying H.R. 7168, 85th Cong., 1st sess. (1957). 
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Subbids frequently are not precise or not responsive to the specifi-
cations; therefore, further negotiations between prime and sub-
contractors are necessary for clarification.34 (b) In preparing 
their bids under time pressure, prime contractors often are unable 
to check a subcontractor's reputation, previous experience, and 
credit standing, causing rejections of subbids which, upon sub-
sequent inquiry, may prove to be quite acceptable.35 (c) Award-
ing authorities often invite bids on alternates, and since different 
subbids may be low on different alternates, negotiations between 
prime contractor and subcontractors are necessary after determina-
tion of the specific alternate to be used.36 (d) The average costs 
of estimating specialty work may not be as significant as con-
tended and they represent a normal part of the costs of competing 
in that type of business.37 (e) Prime contractors cannot rely on 
"first-round" subbids, which generally are too high; therefore, 
general contractors must prepare their bids according to their 
own estimates of the cost of specialty work and negotiate subcon-
tracts for such ·work later.38 (f) Negotiations between prime and 
subcontractors prior to formulation of the prime bids tend to 
lower construction costs to the awarding authority or owner.39 
34 See S. Hearings Before a Subcommittee of the Committee on the Judiciary on S. 
2907, 82d Cong., 2d sess., pp. 150, 164 (1952); Joint Hearing Before the Subcommittees of 
the Committees on the Judiciary on S. 848 and Similar House Bills, 83d Cong., 1st sess., 
pp. 110, 144-145 (1953); S. Hearings Before a Subcommittee of the Committee on the 
Judiciary on S. 1644, 84th Cong., 1st sess., p. 152 (1955); H. Hearings Before Subcommittee 
No. 2 of the Committee on the Judiciary on H.R. 3241, H.R. 3339, H.R. 3340, H.R. 3810, 
H.R. 4313, 85th Cong., 1st sess., p. 145 (1957). 
35 See S. Hearings Before a Subcommittee of the Committee on the Judiciary on S. 
1644, 84th Cong., 1st sess., p. 159, 173 (1955); Joint Hearing on S. 848 and Similar House 
Bills, 83d Cong., 1st sess., pp. 166-167 (1953). 
36 See S. Hearings Before a Subcommittee of the Committee on the Judiciary on S. 
2907, 82d Cong., 2d sess., pp. 136-137, 196 (1952); Joint Hearing Before the Subcommittees 
of the Committees on the Judiciary on S. 848 and Similar House Bills, 83d Cong., 1st 
sess., pp. 144-145 (1953); S. Hearings Before a Subcommittee of the Committee on the 
Judiciary on S. 1644, 84th Cong., 1st sess., p. 151 (1955); H. Hearings Before Subcommittee 
No. 2 of the Committee on the Judiciary on S. 1644 and Similar House Bills, 84th Cong., 
2d sess., pp. 208-209 (1956). 
37 See Report of the Federal Trade Commission in S. Hearings Before a Subcommittee 
of the Committee on the Judiciary on S. 2907, 82d Cong., 2d sess., pp. 274-275 (1952); id., 
pp. 137, 141; id., p. 151; Joint Hearing Before the Suboommittees of the Committees on 
the Judiciary on S. 848 and Similar House Bills, 83d Cong., 1st sess., p. 146 (1953); H. 
Hearings Before Suboommittee No. 2 of the Committee on the Judiciary on S. 1644 and 
Similar House Bills, 84th Cong., 2d sess., p. 210 (1956). 
38 See Report of the Federal Trade Commission, note 37 supra; Report of the Acting 
Comptroller General, id., p. 272; id., p. 151; Joint Hearing Before the Subcommittees of 
the Committees on the Judiciary on S. 848 and Similar House Bills, 83d Cong., 1st sess., 
pp. 153-154, 168 (1953). 
39 See S. Hearings Before a Subcommittee of the Committee on the Judiciary on S. 
2907, 82d Cong., 2d sess., pp. 112, 172; Report of the Assistant Secretary of the Interior, 
in H. Rep. 2362, 84th Cong., 2d sess., p. 19 (1956). 
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We cannot assume that the qualified witnesses who propounded 
the arguments on one side of the "bid shopping and bid peddling" 
controversy are entirely right, and that those who propounded the 
arguments on the other side are entirely wrong. Therefore, their 
seemingly conflicting contentions, mentioned above, must he rec-
onciled on the basis that such practices sometimes may be neces-
sary and beneficial, while sometimes they may be, and in certain 
instances actually have been, unfair, detrimental, or both,40 all 
depending upon the particular circumstances of a given situation. 
Ill. ANTITRUST DIVISION ACTIONS INVOLVING BID DEPOSITORIES 
Antitrust law enforcement cannot be shaped in vacuo. Before 
prosecuting any antitrust case, the Department of Justice considers 
the particular attending circumstances and the equities, in addition 
to the law involved. When it comes to cases concerning bid de-
positories, the equities of bid shopping and. bid peddling are 
pertinent but, as we have seen, their weight may fall on either side 
of the scales. Also pertinent, however, are other practices and 
activities which frequently surround bid depositories and which 
fall rather on the dark side of the bid depository picture. They 
include practices or agreements of price fixing, bid rigging, allocat-
ing markets or customers, and of boycotting or otherwise conspir-
ing against or with competitors, suppliers, customers or labor 
groups in restraint of trade. The records show that in the past 
twenty years at least twenty-eight bid depository situations41 were 
prosecuted by the Department of Justice, civilly, criminally, or 
both.42 It appears from the table below that all those cases, at least 
according to the pleadings, showed some feature or features well 
recognized as unreasonable restraints of trade, not merely the ex-
istence of a bid depository. 
A. Restraints on Free Price Competition 
According to the pleadings, all but two cases explicitly showed 
elements of price fixing or other price interference. In the major-
ity of those cases, such elements were embedded among the terms 
of the alleged conspiracy;43 in other cases they were alleged as 
40 Cf. Ring Constr. Corp. v. Secretary of War, 8 T.C. 1070 (194-7). 
41 See cases listed in the table below. [Note: "Blue Book" citations herein refer to 
CCH, THE FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAws, WITH SUMMARY OF CAsES INSTITUTED BY THE UNITED 
STATES. Cases will be cited: "Blue Book No. --·"] 
42 I.e., counting companion civil and criminal cases as one situation. 
43 E.g., Blue Book Nos. 468, 470, 473, 477, 486, 492, 493, 499, 506, 507, 508, 537, 543'. 
919, 1070, 1149, 1449. 
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effects of the plan.44 One of the two exceptions (Blue Book No. 
545) involved a conspiracy to monopolize and a monopolization 
of the market, hence implicitly also impediments to free price 
competition. The other exception was the Bakersfield case, dis-
cussed below. It follows that bid depository antitrust cases, typi-
cally, involved some combination, conspiracy, or agreement in 
restraint of free price competition, with the depository serving as 
an ancillary device. Since any concerted tampering with the price 
structure is per se illegal under the Sherman Act, 45 such schemes 
represented an offense regardless of whether the participants flatly 
agreed on a fixed price,46 adopted a predetermined formula de-
signed to result in uniform prices, 47 left the decision of who should 
be the "low bidder" to an appointed agent,48 permitted the bid 
depository to eliminate the lowest bids,49 agreed to exchange bids 
in advance for purposes of price comparisons,''° appointed a com-
mon estimator,''1 or used any other procedure directly interfering 
with independent, competitive pricing. 
B. Coercion or Boycott 
Again with the possible exception of two situations, all bid 
depository cases listed on the table showed elements of coercion or 
boycott against competitors of the parties interested in the deposi-
tory plan. Firms engaged in the same business as those interested 
in the plan either were bound to use the depository or else they 
were excluded by group action from at least part of the market. 
In other words, those depositories were either compulsory52 or 
exclusionary.53 In either type of case, the freedom of competitive 
action of independent businessmen allegedly was restricted. Since 
group actions to exclude others from a market ("boycotts") are 
per se illegal under the Sherman Act,54 exclusionary bid deposi-
tories are offensive, even if they provide for no other restrictions. 
As an illustration, consider the case listed under Blue Book No. 
545. As previously mentioned, it did not directly involve price-
44 E.g., Blue Book Nos. 479, 500, 501, 504, 518, 533, 1027. 
45 United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 at 223 (1940). 
46 See cases listed in the table under Blue Book Nos. 473, 492, 499, 506. 
47 See Blue Book Nos. 477, 507, 1449. 
48 See Blue Book No. 506. 
49 See Blue Book Nos. 476, 477, and 500. 
50 See Blue Book Nos. 470, 501, and 1149. 
51 See Blue Book Nos. 470, 504, and 1070. 
52 Blue Book Nos. 476, 477, 478, 479, 499, 500, 501, 504, 919, 1027, 1070, 1149, 1242. 
53 Blue Book Nos. 468, 473, 486, 492, 493, 506, 507, 508, 518, 533, 543, 545, 1449. 
54Fashion Originators' Guild v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457 (1941); Eastern States Retail Lum-
ber Dealers' Assn. v. United States, 234 U.S. 600 (1914). 
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fixing. However, pursuant to the plan, tile contractors who were 
not members of the defendant association were deprived of labor 
by the union, of supplies by the manufacturers, and of business 
orders by the general contractors. A more clear-cut case of illegal 
boycott by multiple groups it is hard to imagine. 
The same legal principles apply even if only one group, the 
members of the depository without help from manufacturers, 
labor unions or others, collectively coerce or boycott contractors.65 
Therefore, depositories must be condemned which impose fines or 
other penalties upon non-conforming contractors.66 For example, 
the case in Blue Book No. 500 shows, among other things, that 
depository members were prohibited, under penalties, from sub-
mitting lower bids on a project after the depository had sifted their 
bids submitted to it. The agreement not to submit subsequent, 
reduced bids was of dubious legality under the Sherman Act; the 
group sanction to enforce it made it more so. 
The two cases which showed no coercion on competitors, re-
ferred to above, involved devices to share the market, in .one in-
stance through a "joint venture arrangement,"67 in the other in-
stance through predetermined quotas.68 Inasmuch as those arrange-
ments may have been considered by the participants to be binding, 
they were in a sense compulsory, although not strictly speaking 
coercive. So viewed, every depository situation listed in the table 
showed that specialty contractors were compelled to abide by de-
pository regulations, or that non-participating competitors were 
discriminated against, or that both those things were done.69 
Numerous depository cases listed in the table show measures 
of coercion or boycott also against manufacturers, jobbers, general 
contractors, or labor. Thus, we find a number of cases in which 
the depository group would collectively threaten to withhold its 
patronage from suppliers who sell directly to general contractors,60 
to non-member specialty contractors,61 or to member specialty con-
tractors who failed to obey depository rules. 62 In one case, mem-
65 United States v. New Orleans Insurance Exchange, (E.D. La. 1957) 148 F. Supp. 
915, affd. 355 U.S. 22 (1957). 
66 E.g., Blue Book Nos. 473, 493, 499, 500, 506. 
67 Blue Book No. 470. 
68 Blue Book No. 537. Coercion was applied upon general contractors to enforce the 
plan. 
59 E.g., Blue Book Nos. 486, 492, 919, 1242, 1449. 
60 Blue Book No. 468. 
61 Blue Book Nos. 486, 493, 499, 506, 518, 533, 545. 
62 Blue Book No. 1149. 
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hers of the depository group forced manufacturers to sell materials 
directly to them and to by-pass jobbers;63 and in another case they 
agreed to boycott suppliers selling products at prices not agreeable 
to them. 64 As with suppliers, so with customers. In a number of 
cases the depository group apparently considered itself to be power-
ful enough to demand that general contractors, owners, and award-
ing authorities do business with members of the group, to the 
exclusion of non-members and violators of the depository rules.65 
In most but not all of those instances, the leverage over customers 
stemmed from support by labor groups, about which more later. 
However achieved, such concerted pressures upon customers may 
constitute not only a conspiracy in violation of section I of the 
Sherman Act, but also a conspiracy or attempt to monopolize or 
monopolization in violation of section 2 of the act. 
The cases of coercion or boycott by depositories against labor 
are few, 66 since successful coercion may align labor groups with 
depositories on the side of co-defendants or co-conspirators, making 
the situation one of "participation by labor groups."67 The two 
cases of coercion against labor listed in the table, however, illustrate 
both illicit purposes for which such coercion might be used. In 
the case Blue Book No. 499, laborers working for non-members of 
the depository organization, a chapter of NECA, were boycotted to 
force non-member electrical' subcontractors into the organization. 
And in the Arizona Consolidated case (Blue Book No. 1449), de-
fendants allegedly agreed to blacklist and boycott masons and 
plasterers working for general contractors who do not accept bids 
exclusively from members of the defendant association. 
C. Allocation of Markets or Customers 
If subcontractors have reached a foregone conclusion as to who 
is to serve certain markets or specific customers, competitive bid-
ding becomes a fraud and a sham. An agreement or conspiracy 
to that effect is likely to constitute a per se violation of the Sherman 
Act, since it affects the bid price and excludes all but one firm 
63 Blue Book No. 543. 
64 Blue Book No. 1070. This is an instance of "primary" rather than "secondary" 
boycott. 
65 Blue :Book Nos. 468, 486, 492, 499, 506, 508, 537, 543, 545, 919, 1027, 1242, 1449. 
66 :Blue :Book Nos. 499 and 1449. 
67 See cases cited in note 71 infra. :Blue Book No. 499 distinctly showed both boycott 
of certain laborers and cooperation by a labor union. As we know, the interests of the 
individuals and those of their organization do not always fully coincide. 
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from that particular business.68 Bid rotation, quota allotments, 
fictitious bids, complimentary bids, and other devices might 
camouflage such arrangements, but if discovered they add to the 
evidence of intent and consciousness of guilt. Such proved to be 
the case in United States v. Las Vegas Merchant Plumbers Associa-
tion/9 one of the few fully litigated bid depository cases on the 
record. The indictment in that case contained allegations of a 
whole series of restrictions, but the convictions were upheld by the 
circuit court of appeals-as far as the sufficiency of the evidence 
was concerned-mainly because the record showed customer alloca-
tion, camouflaged by fictitious and complimentary bids, and price-
:fixing.10 
D. Participation by Other Groups in Conspiracy in 
Restraint of Trade 
As the table below shows, very few of the bid depositories 
attacked by .the Antitrust Division for coercion or boycott relied 
on the strength of their members alone. In most cases, participa-
tion by labor groups,71 suppliers,72 or customers78 was alleged. In 
contrast with the various restrictions previously discussed, agree-
ments between specialty contractors or their associations and labor 
or other groups are not necessarily illegal in themselves. Trade 
associations, for instance, often negotiate on behalf of their mem-
bers collective bargaining agreements with labor unions, which 
may be perfectly legal for them to do. Trade associations may 
legally enter also into purchase contracts with suppliers on behalf 
of their members, or they may negotiate with awarding authorities 
and other customers about standards and specifications of equip-
ment to be supplied by members. However, the agreements and 
68 One of the leading decisions holding market allocations to be per se illegal under 
the Sherman Act is United States v. National Lead Co., 332 U.S. 319 (1947). Concerning 
customer allocation, cf. United States v. American Linen Supply Co., (N.D. Ill. 1956) 141 
F. Supp. 105 at 114. 
69 (9th Cir. 1954) 210 F. (2d) 732, cert. den. 348 U.S. 817 (1954). Cf. United States v. 
New England Concrete Pipe Corp., D.C. Mass., Civ. No. 57-631-A, Crim. No. 57-156-A, Blue 
Book Nos. 1343 and 1349. 
70 For other cases involving allocation, see Blue Book Nos. 493, 506, 508, 537, 1070, 
1149, 545. The case last cited charged attempted monopolization of the Detroit tile market, 
i.e., an allocation of that market by the defendant association to itself and its members. 
71 Blue Book Nos. 468, 473, 475, 477, 478, 479, 485, 492, 499, 500, 501, 504, 507, 508, 
518, 533, 543, 545, 1070. 
72 Blue Book Nos. 545, 919, 1149. 
78 Blue Book Nos. 493, 1242. 
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collaboration with which we are concerned here are those that 
help tighten the rules or practices of bid depositories. It is difficult 
to imagine an agreement or joining of forces between a bid deposi-
tory and representatives of labor, customers, or suppliers that 
would not serve some restrictive purposes or effects. Therefore, 
such alignments with other groups are most likely to make bid 
depositories vulnerable to antitrust attacks. 
It appears that the most frequent of those alignments are with 
labor unions or their representatives. Such combinations are 
risky not only for the depository members but also for the unions. 
In a number of our depository cases, unions or union representa-
tives have been named as defendants.74 The statutory exemptions 
from the antitrust laws for labor do not shield labor officials who 
engage in deals with depositories to help enforce anticompetitive 
restrictions. It was so held in the Las Vegas Merchant Plumbers 
case, above. For the Supreme Court of the United States in Allen 
Bradley Co. v. Local Union No. 3,75 decided that if unions combine 
with non-labor groups and "aid and abet businessmen to do the 
precise things which that [Sherman Antitrust] Act prohibits," they 
are liable under that act. It is, therefore, reprehensive for a 
depository group to persuade a union to withdraw laborers from 
contractors failing to obey the depository rules.76 But even more 
stringently anticompetitive union arrangements have come to the 
attention of the Antitrust Division. For instance, it was alleged 
in United States v. Employer Plasterers' Association of Allegheny 
County (Blue Book No. 507): 
"The defendant labor unions entered into agreements with 
the defendant association . . . which . . . provided that union 
labor would be supplied solely to members of the association, 
notwithstanding the fact that numerous ... contractors who 
were not members of the association were willing to agree to 
all requirements of the defendant labor unions .... " 
"The defendant association . . . with the knowledge, con-
sent, and support of the defendant labor unions, arbitrarily 
excluded from membership certain ... contractors who had 
sought membership in the association, with the result that 
74E.g., Blue Book Nos. 468, 476, 486, 492, 499, 504, 507, 508, 533, 543, 545, 1070. 
75 325 U.S. 797 at 801 (1945). Cf. United States v. Employing Plasterers Assn. of 
Chicago, 347 U.S. 186 (1954). 
76 E.g., in Blue Book No. 476, depository members who had complied with the rules 
were issued a "certificate of fair competition," which had to be displayed on the job site. 
Those contractors who failed to obtain such a certificate were to be deprived of union labor. 
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such excluded contractors were unable to employ union labor 
necessary for participation in all building programs ... where 
union labor was specified."77 
Yet another purpose of depositories combining with labor groups 
may be to prevent general contractors from engaging in bid shop-
ping and bid peddling. Thus, Blue Book Nos. 500 and 501 show 
cases in which union labor allegedly was to be withheld from any 
subcontractor attempting to do a job on which he had not sub-
mitted the low bid through the depository. No matter how un-
ethical the subcontractors may consider bid shopping practices to 
be, they cannot lawfully prevent such practices by thus combining 
and conspiring with labor groups. For even if it be assumed that 
the subcontractors may have a legitimate grievance against bid 
shoppers, laborers do not, as long as proper wages and working 
conditions are offered.78 
Only brief comment is required on depository situations which 
involve suppliers as participants. Materials and equipment ob-
viously are essential to subcontractors' work. In all such situations 
listed in the table, manufacturers or jobbers were persuaded or 
coerced by the subcontractor groups to refuse their products to 
subcontractors not conforming with the rules and regulations of 
the groups. Such agreements and combinations, of course, are out-
right commercial boycotts and per se illegal under the Sherman 
Act.79 
There remain the instances of participation by customers. 
Conspiring to coerce general contractors and owners into accept-
ance of bid depository rules is one thing, but to obtain their active 
cooperation would seem to require extraordinary persuasion. Al-
though, as previously mentioned, participation by customers was 
alleged in two cases, the fact that no customers were named as de-
fendants may indicate that their participation did not appear to 
be very strong.80 
IV. SEITLED AND UNSETI'LED PROBLEMS CONCERNING 
BID DEPOSITORIES 
Since the middle fifties, the principle has been established that 
specialty contractors' depository arrangements may involve inter-
state coIIJ.merce and thus be subject to federal regulation under the 
77 Comparable, but not involving a bid depository as such, was Local No. 175 v. United 
States, (6th Cir. 1955) 219 F. (2d) 431. 
78 Cf. United States v. Las Vegas Merchant Plumbers Assn., 325 U.S. 797 (1945). 
79 See authorities cited in note 54 supra. 
so See the pertinent terms of conspiracy alleged in Blue Book Nos. 1027 and 1449. 
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Sherman Act.81 The Government, of course, has the burden of 
proving the factual elements of interstate commerce. Previous 
misapprehensions about the applicability of the Sherman Act may 
account for the creation of some of the earlier depository schemes 
which, once it has been established that the Sherman Act applies, 
appear to be in glaring violation of that act.82 Our table, however, 
shows also quite recent cases involving restrictions of the types 
which are clearly illegal. Some offenders apparently refuse to 
learn or to be deterred. That, however, is only part of the bid 
depository picture as it appears today. As indicated at the begin-
ning of this article, there exist also honest differences of opinion 
and doubts about some aspects of bid depositories, particularly on 
the basis of the Bakersfield judgment. Those doubts can hardly 
concern the grosser types of restrictive arrangements, such as price-
fixing, bid rotation, boycotts of non-members, collusion with labor 
groups, etc. Rather, those doubts revolve around the questions 
of whether depositories in the absence of such flagrant abuses may 
be legal, and if so, under what conditions. Although Bakersfield, 
so far, is the only litigated judgment in a civil antitrust case involv-
ing bid depositories, it is not the only source to be considered in 
answering the question of whether there may be innocuous bid 
depositories. The general position of the Antitrust Division re-
garding depositories and pertinent principles developed in other 
court opinions, are not eclipsed by one trial court's opinion on one 
specific depository. 
A. The Position and Policy of the Antitrust Division in the Past 
Of the numerous consent decrees referred to in the table, be-
low, the greater number prohibit continuation of depository 
activities through injunctions which are qualified as to the purposes 
or effects of such depositories.83 For example, the consent decree 
in United States v. Employing Plasterers' Association of Allegheny 
County (Blue Book No. 507) enjoined defendants from: 
81 United States v. Employing Plasterers Assn. of Chicago, 347 U.S. 186 (1954); United 
States v. Employing Lathers Assn. of Chicago, 347 U.S. 198 (1954); Las Vegas Merchant 
Plumbers Assn. v. United States, (9th Cir. 1954) 210 F. (2d) 732, cert. den. 348 U.S. 817 
(1954); United States v. Northeastern Texas Chapter, NECA, (5th Cir. 1950) 181 F. (2d) 
30 at 33-34; Local 175 v. United States, (6th Cir. 1955) 219 F. (2d) 431. 
82 In 1954, the unsuccessful argument was made, perhaps bona fide, in a case com-
parable to a bid depository case that " .•• the indictment did not charge a violation of 
the Sherman Act, but constituted merely a charge of local restraint and monopoly not 
reached by the Act." Local 175 v. United States, (6th Cir. 1955) 219 F. (2d) 431 at 433. 
w~~~•~m~m~~~m~••~~ 
1242. 
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"(a) Creating, operating or participating in the operation of 
any association of ... contractors maintaining a bid depository 
or any similar plan or device designed to maintain or to fix the 
price of plaster ... or to limit competition in bidding ... or 
having the effect of limiting the awarding authority in the free 
choice of plastering or lathing contractors."84 
Again, the decree in United States v. Heating, Piping and Air Con-
ditioning Contractors Association of Southern California (Blue 
Book No. 628) enjoined defendants from "creating, operating, or 
participating in the operation of any association or other group ... 
maintaining a bid depository .... , or similar device, designed to or 
having the effect of, arbitrarily fixing or stabilizing the prices .... "85 
While, as a practical matter, it may be difficult or risky for de-
fendants to operate any depository in the teeth of such injunctive 
provisions, in legal analysis those injunctions stop short of prohibit-
ing depositories, absolutely. Hence, those decrees seem to indicate 
that some form of bid depository might be devised which is in-
nocuous under the antitrust laws. 
True, in a minority of cases, bid depositories have been pro-
hibited in absolute terms.86 We find, for instance, in United 
States v. Santa Barbara County, NECA (Blue Book No. 630), that 
defendants were enjoined from, among other things, "creating, 
operating, or participating in the operation of any association ... 
maintaining a bid depository or similar common agency for the 
deposit of bids, or similar device." Even more flatly, defendants in 
United States v. Tile Contractors Association of America, Inc. 
(Blue Book No. 533) were not permitted "to create, operate or 
participate in the operation of any bid depository."87 
Those decrees with absolute prohibitions against depositories 
do not, it is submitted, disprove the conclusion in the foregoing 
paragraph. Certainly, in view of the overlapping dates of the 
consent decrees with absolute and of those with qualified injunc-
tions, it cannot be inferred from them that the Antitrust Division 
at some time changed its policy and position. The argument could 
84 CCH 1940-1943 Trade Cas. 1]56,025, at p. 79. Emphasis supplied. 
85 Id., 1]56,146, at p. 570. Emphasis supplied. 
86 Blue Book Nos. 533, 543, 545, 567, 604, 630, 679, II53. 
87 Similar: Blue Book Nos. 543, 545, 604, and ll53. In some instances, the distinction 
between absolute and qualified injunctions against depositories depends on very subtle 
differences in language. For instance, compare the wording in Heating, Piping & Air 
Conditioning Contractors Assn., quoted in the text supra, with United States v. Southern 
Cal. Marble Association (Blue Book No. 567) containing the unqualified prohibition 
against "operating or participating in the operation of any bid depository or of any scheme 
••. designed to maintain or fix ••• price[s]." 
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be made that absolute interdiction reflects the true view of the 
division, and that qualifications were written into some decrees as 
a result only of the particular defendants' negotiating skills or 
bargaining position. Although it is true that consent decrees are 
bargained compromises, the decrees with merely qualified prohibi-
tions are so numerous that they cannot all be ascribed to defi-
ciencies in the Government's cases or bargaining techniques. The 
natural explanation for the two divergent types of prohibitions is 
that different situations show different degrees of (1) risk to com-
petition connected with the continuation of any bid depository, 
and (2) need to dissipate the effects of past wrongdoing. The 
more reprehensible the restraints practiced by defendants were in 
the past, and the more effective they were in strangling competition, 
the more stringent have to be the injunctions. In some cases it 
may well have appeared too risky to permit continuing operation 
of any depository by the defendants. 
Other factors corroborate the view that the Antitrust Division 
never pursued a policy of condemning all bid depositories "per se." 
Thus, the consent decree in United States v. Reno Merchant 
Plumbing and Heating Contractors, Inc. (Blue Book No. 1027), 
in section V (A), recognized bid depositories, in principle, by en-
joining defendants from "submitting copies of duplicate bids or 
otherwise disclosing such bids to any person except a bid depository 
(emphasis supplied)," although the decree in section VI prohib-
its, of course, all typical kinds of compulsory, exclusionary, or oth-
erwise anticompetitive depository rules.88 Furthermore, a flexible 
attitude toward depositories would be in keeping with the depart-
ment's attitude toward the various Federal Construction Contract 
bills in past Congresses.89 Since the department in reviewing those 
bills apparently felt that lawful means to inhibit bid shopping and 
bid peddling would not run counter to antitrust policies, bid de-
positories might be acceptable, if they were designed only to dis-
courage bid shopping and free from restrictive rules and nefarious 
collateral activities. Finally, consistent with such thinking, the 
Antitrust Division recently granted "railroad releases" on at least 
two bid depository plans. The contents of those plans and the 
parties involved have not been published, but it is known that both 
those plans rely essentially upon publicity concerning the com-
ss Such prohibited depository rules include: compulsory filing of bids with a deposi-
tory prior to their submission to awarding authorities; restrictions as to time and place 
at which all bids must be filed; restrictions against bidding after bid opening; restrictions 
against revising bids after opening; imposition of penalties; etc. 
so See text at note 30 supra. · 
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peting subbids, and that they are free from any compulsory or 
exclusionary features. The fact that experienced businessmen 
and counsel worked out those plans would indicate that depository 
regulations need have no "teeth" and yet may afford some help 
against bid shopping. 
B. Court Opinions Prior to Bakersfield 
In the criminal antitrust case of United States v. Northeast 
Texas Chapter, NECA, (Blue Book No. 919), paragraph 27 (c) of 
the second count of the indictment charged as a separate term of 
the alleged conspiracy that defendants established a "Bid Registra-
tion System" under which each contractor would report his intent 
to submit a bid on any particular job, under penalty of a $1,000 fine 
for failure to do so. In its brief on appeal to the Fifth Circuit, 
filed July I, 1949, p. 21, the Government argued that paragraph 
27 (c) amounted to a charge of price-fixing violations, which "are 
per se a violation of the Sherman ~ct." Note, however, that in 
this case, which was appealed on the pleadings, a price stabilizing 
intent and function of the depository had been alleged, and that 
the depository had been alleged to be compulsory under heavy 
penalties. Moreover, the "Bid Registration System" was incrimi-
nated in the indictment at the very end of a lengthy list of palpably 
nefarious agreements, which that System allegedly "implemented." 
Thus, it can hardly be said that this indictment represented an at-
tack upon depositories, as such. The Fifth Circuit, discussing the 
illegality of the various agreements charged, concluded: 
"Under the circumstances alleged, the price fixing agree-
ments and the illegal inclusion of profits not related to the 
usual trade, are illegal. Likewise may be the boycott of those 
who will not operate in accordance with the plan .... Agree-
ment upon prices and terms for the sale of lighting fixtures 
may likewise be shown to be illegal. In the very nature of the 
trade and commerce alleged, these agreements, some per se, 
and others as a matter of fact, constitute an illegal restraint .... 
What has just been said as to the agreements charged in the first 
count, is likewise applicable to those charged in the second 
and is based upon principles already well established in such 
cases."00 
Although these legal conclusions are not as clear as they could be, 
it appears that the court emphasized the price-fixing and boycott 
eo 181 F. {2d) 30 at 33 (1950). 
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features,91 which it considered as illegal per se, and probably 
deemed the registration scheme to be illegal only "as a matter of 
fact," i.e., under all the circumstances of the case. The opinion 
as a whole, however, reflects a skeptical attitude toward bid de-
positories. One may doubt whether any restrictive features in a 
depository arrangement would be acceptable to that court, even if 
prevention of bid peddling were advanced as the purpose of that 
arrangement. 
There are some Supreme Court opinions which contain prin-
ciples which may serve as a guide in determining acceptable and 
unacceptable characteristics of depositories. Thus, a depository 
arrangement which is compulsory upon members probably violates 
a principle announced in Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. United 
States.02 The case involved an "auction pool," a bid depository 
of sorts, by which a group of pipe manufacturers determined who 
should submit the low bid in any given instance. The Court said: 
"Total suppression of the trade in the commodity is not 
necessary in order to render the combination one in restraint 
of trade. It is the effect of the combination in limiting and 
restricting the right of each of the members to transact busi-
ness in the ordinary way ... that is regarded. All the facts and 
circumstances are, however, to be q:msidered."03 
The same principle of "freedom of trade" for the individual to 
conduct business in his own chosen way was emphasized in 
Paramount Famous Lasky Corporation v. United States.04 The 
principle that price information concerning prospective contracts 
should not be exchanged among trade members, but that the 
exchange of statistics on past transactions may be innocuous if 
given wide publicity, was developed in American Column Co. 
v. United States,05 United States v. American Linseed Oil Co.96 
and Maple Flooring Association v. United States.91 Applied to 
a bid depository situation, this principle requires that informa-
tion about the participants' bids should be tabulated and dis-
closed only after expiration of the time for submission of the 
91 Cf. the similar approach of the Ninth Circuit in its Las Vegas opinion, mentioned 
in the text at note 69 supra. 
92 175 U.S. 2ll (1899). 
93 Id. at 244. Emphasis added. 
94 282 U.S. 30 at 42 (1930). Cf. Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, 359 U.S. 207 
(1959). 
95 257 U.S. 377 (1921). 
96 262 U .s. 371 (1923). 
01268 U.S. 563 (1925). 
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bids to the awarding authority, and that it then should be made 
available to all persons interested. A further principle which 
should be observed in evaluating bid depository rules underlies 
the decision in Fashion Originators Guild v. FTC.98 That case 
stands for the proposition that a scheme intended to prevent an 
unethical practice, namely, "fashion piracy," will nevertheless be 
vitiated if it violates the antitrust laws. Therefore, depositories 
designed to prevent the "unethical practices" of bid shopping and 
bid peddling are nevertheless illegal, if they are unduly restrictive. 
Although the Rule of Reason permits restrictions that are "ancil-
lary" to a legitimate principal transaction,99 it will not do to regi-
ment an industry through depository rules,1°0 espetially if those 
rules are peremptory and bristle with policing and penalty provi-
sions.101 Since not all contract negotiations after bidding are 
unethical, depository rules to promote ethical and inhibit unethi-
cal practices ought to be as subtle as their aim.102 It is submitted 
that all those principles are observed best by depositories which 
rely merely upon post-award publicity on bid data, like those on 
which the above referred to "railroad releases" were granted. 
V. THE BAKERSFIELD CASE103 
As in all previous antitrust cases involving bid depositories, the 
Government pleaded a combination and conspiracy which was 
broader than the mere formation of the depository and the adoption 
of its rules. The last four subparagraphs of paragraph 13 of the 
complaint charged (1) compulsion of members and of others to 
use the depository, (2) compulsion of members to boycott general 
contractors who fail to deal exclusively through the depository, (3) 
compulsion of general contractors to deal exclusively with the 
depository, and (4) exclusion of outsiders from sales and installa-
tion of plumbing supplies. Accordingly, the Government denied 
a request by defendants to admit that the alleged conspiracy con-
98 (2d Cir. 1940) 114 F. (2d) 80, affd. 312 U.S. 457 (1941). 
99 See United States v. Addyston Pipe and Steel Co., (6th Cir. 1898) 85 F. 271 at 280, 
282, 283, affd. 175 U.S. 211 (1899). 
100 Cf. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 211 at 238, 240 (1899). 
Even at common law, ancillary restrictions are permissible only if they are consonant with 
the interests of the parties and of the public. Attorney General v. The Adelaide Steamship 
Co., [1913] A.C. 781 at 794. 
101 Cf. United States v. Northeast Texas Chapter, NECA, (5th Cir. 1950) 181 F. (2d) 30. 
The Government specifically attacked such agreements, among other things, in the cases 
listed under Blue Book Nos. 468 and 504. 
102 If "unethical dealing" reaches proportions of an unfair trade practice, regulation 
by the Federal Trade Commission may be invoked. 
10a See citation in note 1 supra. 
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sisted merely of the agreement on the depository's rules. The first 
two subparagraphs of paragraph 13, however, alleged squarely the 
formation of the depository and the adoption and enforcement of 
its rules, which were attached to the pleading. As the proceedings 
unfolded, it became increasingly clear that the restrictive de-
pository rules were the gist of the complaint. They were exten-
sively discussed in the Government's pre-trial memorandum and 
post-trial brief, characterizing some of them as illegal per se. 
Perhaps more than in any previous antitrust case, the depository 
itself was at trial.104 
In the post-trial brief the Government specifically argued also 
against those rules which most directly concerned bid peddling, 
namely, (a) a rule against submission of further bids to the general 
contractor within 120 days after the first bid opening, (b) a rule 
requiring the subcontractors to name their intended sub-subcon-
tractors in their bids, and (c) a rule making acceptance of the 
lowest depository bid binding on the general contractors. 
As to the alleged coercion and boycott, the Government named 
three subcontractors and one general contractor alleged to have 
been affected. Only two subcontractors and one general contrac-
tor testified to the effect that they had been excluded from some 
business for failure to join the depository. 
In its Findings of Fact, the court found (with certain exceptions 
not applicable here): "[T]here is no evidence that: ... (c) any 
manufacturer or supplier ... has been coerced or intimidated ... ; 
( e) any general contractor or subcontractor has been threatened 
or intimidated, or in any way coerced .... "105 The court also 
found: ". . . The defendants established the bid depository pri-
marily to eliminate bid peddling .... "106 
In other words, the Government failed to prove to the satis-
faction of the court (1) any ill intent and (2) any restraints, espe-
cially coercion or boycott, beyond those inherent in the depository 
rules.107 As to the latter, the court concluded, as a matter of law: 
"The adoption and enforcement of the bid depository rules 
other than rules 6, 8 and 12B, do not constitute a boycott, nor 
do they singly or collectively constitute any unreasonable re-
104 "The main thrust of the Government is against the establishment and operation by 
the defendants of the bid depository in accordance with [its] rules." Finding of Fact No. 23. 
105 Finding No. 55. 
106 Finding No. 54. 
107 With respect to both intent and extraneous restraints the Bakersfield situation 
thus assumed a complexion radically different from the Las Vegas and Northeast Texas 
Chapter situations, discussed supra. A detailed comparison of those opinions, therefore, 
is impracticable. 
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straint of trade, nor are they per se violations of the Sherman 
Act."1os 
In his Order of December 31, 1957, Judge Jertberg had explained 
why he considered rules 6, 8 and 12B to be price-fixing and illegal 
per se. He went on to say (p. 8): "The remaining rules are rea-
sonable and were designed to correct evils which exi~ted in the 
Bakersfield trade area prior to the establishment of the bid de-
pository." Thus, the Government was entitled to relief only with 
respect to the bid depository rules 6, 8 and 12B, which provided, 
respectively, (I) that separate bids must be submitted for plumb-
ing and for heating and ventilating, and combination bids must 
not be lower by more than five percent than the separate bids 
added together; (2) that successful bidders shall pay depository 
fees of one percent on each of the contracts for plumbing, for 
heating and ventilating, for sheet metal, and for electrical work, 
up to a maximum of $1,000 on each such contract; and (3) that be-
tween the time of opening and the time when bids are made 
available to general contractors, the bids may be withdrawn upon 
payment of one percent of the quoted price, up to a maximum of 
$1,000. 
Judge Jertberg's judgment of May 26, 1958, enjoined the de-
fendants from continuing, reviving, or renewing "the aforesaid 
combination and conspiracy,"109 and from adopting, enforcing, or 
continuing in effect any of the provisions of rule 6, rule 8, or 
rule 12b, or any rule which (1) requires submission of separate 
bids for plumbing or separate bids for heating and ventilating; (2) 
limits the price at which a combination bid may be submitted; (3) 
requires that the successful bidder through the depository shall 
pay any fee; and (4) permits withdrawal of any bid between bid 
opening and delivery of bids to any gen~ral contractor. 
Against the background of general principles and precedents 
discussed hereinabove, it appears that Judge Jertberg's approach 
bears some resemblance to that of Chief Justice Stone in Maple 
Flooring Association v. United States. Failing, like Chief Justice 
Stone, to find any restraints or abuses outside the depository rules, 
Judge J ertberg considered whether those rules amounted to illegal 
restraints (as it were, "of necessity," as the late Chief Justice had 
put it). Unlike Chief Justice Stone, Judge Jertberg dealt with the 
10s Conclusion of Law No. 3. 
109 That combination and conspiracy, it must be remembered, was limited, in the 
court's view, to the ad~ption and enforcement of the three specific rules discussed in the 
text, supra, and did not cover the depository rules in their entirety. 
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plan not in its entirety but considered its parts separately. Also 
unlike Chief Justice Stone, he in essence upheld a plan which, in 
his own opinion, had contained illegal features and opportunities 
for abuses. 
The relief provided for by Judge J ertberg was limited but con-
sistent with his view of the case. Matters, however, did not rest 
there. He inserted a proviso into the judgment whereby the de-
fendants, within one year after entry of that judgment, could 
submit to the court a new plan for operation of_ the depository 
which, if approved, would cause the court to "modify" the judg-
ment "to permit the operation of a bid depository in accordance 
with such plan or modification thereof." No burden was put upon 
defendants to show need for such modification. The defendants 
were prompt in availing themselves of that privilege. The result 
was a "Modified Final Judgment," dated December 22, 1958, by 
Judge Yankwich, who had not participated in the trial of the case. 
That modified judgment reiterates the conclusion of Judge Jert-
berg that defendants combined and conspired in violation of the 
Sherman Act by adopting and enforcing rules 6, 8 and 12B, and 
it reiterates also Judge Jertberg's injunctions against reviving or 
continuing those rules, against the requirement of separate bids, 
and against price limitations on combined bids. Judge Jertberg's 
prohibition against payments of any fees by successful bidders 
through the depository has been changed into a prohibition against 
such fees if, in the aggregate, they exceed the "amount reasonably 
required for the operation and maintenance of such bid deposi-
tory." [Section IV (a) (iii)]. Instead of Judge Jertberg's outright 
prohibition against withdrawals of bids during the interval of time 
between opening and submission to general contractors, we now 
find injunctions only against coercion and collusion to cause such 
withdrawals and against giving or accepting any money for such 
withdrawals [Section IV (c) and (d)]. 
Judge Yankwich added a new section IV-A, requiring that 
bid openings by the depository be conducted upon advance notice 
to interested general and subcontractors, and that the results be 
announced to those who attend the bid opening. 
Attached as an exhibit to the Modified Final Judgment is the 
defendants' new depository plan which, Judge Yankwich says (in 
section IV B): " ... does not violate the antitrust laws of the United 
States, provided that the defendants in so operating shall, in all 
other respects, be subject to all of the provisions of this judgment." 
[Emphasis supplied.] In accordance with the court's injunction, 
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rule 6 of this new plan omits the previous requirement for separate 
bids on different types of work and the price limitation on combi-
nation bids. Taking advantage of the fact that the modified, in 
contrast to the original, judgment does not absolutely prohibit fee 
payments by successful bidders, the new rule 8 simply cuts those 
fees, which had been found to be illegal, from one to one-half per-
cent for each contract, and reduces the maximum fee from $1,000 
to $250. Apparently, Judge Yankwich was convinced that such 
payments do not exceed "the amount reasonably required for the 
operation" of the depository.Judge J ertberg might have considered 
this new version of rule 8 contrary to the tenor of his original 
judgment. More curiously, rule 12B, which both judgments spec-
ify as one of the rules which are conspiratorial and illegal, is 
verbatim the same in the new- and in the old plan. There is no 
change with respect to withdrawals of bids between opening and 
submission to general contractors, and no change in the penalty for 
such withdrawals. This rule, condemned though it was and is, 
now also is approved by the court, because Judge Yankwich thought 
his injunctions against collusive practices in connection therewith 
make it harmless.110 The technical workmanship of the final dis-
position of the Bakersfield case shows similarities to that of a Rube 
Goldberg contraption. Uninformed persons reading the approved 
rules of the Bakersfield depository may easily overlook the fact that 
the court's approval has been limited, or supplemented, by "all of 
the provisions in this judgment." Those provisions require that 
the opening of the bids be done in public, and they include various 
injunctions, especially against collusive use of the rules. They also 
include the usual visitation rights for representatives of the Depart-
ment of Justice, as well as retention of jurisdiction in the court. 
Whatever may be said in explanation or defense of the Bakers-
field judgments, it is submitted that these criticisms remain: 
(1) There is no detailed discussion or evaluation of the re-
strictive depository rules which the court upheld, no specification 
or evaluation of the "evils" which those rules were deemed to com-
bat, much less an explanation of the reasons or weighing processes 
by which the court arrived at the conclusion that the remaining 
restrictions are preferable to the previous "evils." Since those 
unspecified "evils" probably include bid peddling and bid shop-~ 
ping practices, the unwarranted inference is created that all such 
practices are evil, under any circumstances. 
110 The Department of Justice, upon hearing on the proposed new rules, objected to 
the retention of rule 12B, especially to the continued provision for penalties. It also ob-
jected to the retention of fee payments, if at a reduced scale, in new rule 8. 
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(2) The trial judge failed to grasp the tying character of the 
following provision in rule 6, which has not been vitiated by either 
the original or the modified final judgment: 
"All bids are to be submitted to the depository upon condition 
that either the plumbing, or heating and ventilating, or sheet 
metal or electrical portion of any bid may be used by the gen-
eral contractor with any other plumbing, or heating and 
ventilating, or sheet metal or electrical bid or portion of a bid, 
submitted through the depository." [Emphasis supplied.]111 
In other words, if a general contractor uses the bid depository for 
work on one phase of those mechanical specialties, he must use it 
for all work on any of those mechanical specialties. It is difficult 
to see why this tying provision, which appears to run counter to 
section 3 of the Clayton Act, is necessary to combat the evils of bid 
peddling or bid shopping. There is no discussion by the court on 
this clause, although it was argued by the Government. 
(3) Rule IO of the depository provides that when bids for a 
specific project are once opened, there shall be no bidding on that 
project for a period of 120 days by contractors who failed to bid 
in the first instance (unless the plans and specifications have been 
revised in an amount exceeding 25 percent of the work or mate-
rials prescribed in the original plans and specifications). The de-
fendants argued that the original bidders, who had gone to con-
siderable expense in preparing their bids, should be protected 
against subsequent bidders, even though the awarding authority 
may have rejected the general contractor's original bid because the 
price was too high. This rule, as the Government pointed out, has 
nothing to do with bid peddling. As a renunciation to compete 
by those who did not participate in the first bidding, this rule 
amounts to an outright agreement in restraint of trade. Its purpose 
apparently is to induce subcontractors to participate in the deposi-
tory procedure, since otherwise they lose their chance on a possible 
rebid. The court sustained rule IO, without stating specific reasons. 
It is submitted that this rule should have been enjoined because 
(a) it is unduly restrictive in itself; (b) it tends to compel members 
to bid through the depository; and (c) it is not justified as a meas-
ure against unethical bid peddling. 
111 This tie-in is further strengthened by rule 11, reading: "All plumbing, heating 
and ventilating, sheet metal and electrical bids shall be submitted upon the condition that 
the bid may be used only in combination with a plumbing, heating and ventilating, sheet 
metal or electrical bid which has been submitted through the depository. Said condition 
of bid will be printed upon the bid form provided by the depository." 
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(4) The provisions in rule 12B for penalties payable to the 
depository in cases of bid withdrawals are not made sufficiently 
harmless by Judge Yankwich's injunctions against collusive exer-
cise of the bid withdrawal privilege. Rule 12B clearly tends to 
increase prices. For one thing, bidders will be extra careful to 
avoid bidding so low as to risk the necessity of withdrawal. For 
another thing, even a sound bid might be withdrawn, if the bidder 
finds that it is way below his competitors' bids and likely to arouse 
their resentment. General business relationships, esprit de corps, 
or other considerations may prompt such voluntary withdrawals. 
The injunctions of the modified judgment against collusive with-
drawals are not applicable to those withdrawals. On the other 
hand, complete freedom to withdraw bids may invite frequent 
elimination of low bids and even collusive practices, despite the 
injunctions. One solution of those seemingly conflicting consid-
erations might be to permit withdrawal only if a bid is based on a 
bona fide error. Such error should have to be demonstrated and 
explained, perhaps to a special committee. Since, as a practical 
matter, the showing of an error could not require elaborate proof 
or procedures, a further deterrent in form of moderate penalties 
might be provided for. It is not illogical to pay for an error. How-
ever, such penalties should be payable not to the depository but to 
the awarding authority. The depository suffers no harm by with-
drawal of a low bid. Payment to the awarding authority would 
partly compensate it for the higher prices of the other subcontrac-
tors. That solution would be in the interest of the public, which 
bid depositories are supposed to serve. 
VI. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
From the foregoing analysis, a. number of things are clear. The 
typical bid depository arrangements in the building and specialty 
contractors' trades are subject to federal jurisdiction under the 
Sherman Act. Numerous depositories were organized and operated 
in the past twenty or more years. Normally, at least one of the pur-
poses of such depositories is the inhibition of so-called bid shopping 
and bid peddling. In numerous instances, including all instances 
in which the Antitrust Division instituted proceedings, bid deposi-
tories had further anticompetitive purposes or effects, at least ac-
cording to the Antitrust Division's pleadings. Such depository 
plans included per se violations of the Sherman Act, e.g., price-
fixing and group boycotts. They also included arrangements with 
labor or other groups to help enforce the depository rules. When-
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ever depositories organize groups with the aim of foreclosing others 
from competing for business, there can be no doubt that they vio-
late the law. 
A different problem is represented by depository organizations 
which, without directly aiming at the exclusion of competitors 
from a market and without otherwise violating the Sherman Act 
per se, seek to prevent bid peddling and bid shopping by compul-
sory restrictions upon their participants. Such compulsory rules 
may vary greatly in scope and intensity. They may amount to rela-
tively mild and unimportant encroachments upon freedom in 
business conduct; for instance, they may require bid copies to be 
filed at a certain place and date, or payments to be made toward 
the cost of administration. Anyone entering, free from coercion, 
an agreement to do things of that type will hardly be considered to 
have restrained trade unreasonably. 
Other instances of compulsory rules may attempt to regulate 
vital phases in the business conduct of their participants and, by 
virtue of their nature and intricacy, amount to something like 
regimentation. The more intricate and far-reaching such rules are, 
the more likely will they provide also for penalties against infrac-
tions. The evaluation of such compulsory arrangements, in the 
absence of per se violations, requires that all facts and circum-
stances of the specific situation be taken into account. However, 
since group power and group activities are involved, the border-
line of legality as established by Supreme Court precedents sur-
rounds such schemes rather tightly. The Bakersfield plan falls into 
this category. With due respect to the eminent judge who wrote 
the Modified Final Judgment, it is submitted that the plan which 
he approved is unduly restrictive by generally accepted standards 
of reasonableness. 
The Antitrust Division has taken a stern but not inflexible 
position toward depositories, as is apparent from the record. How-
ever, it probably will not interpret the Bakersfield judgment to 
mean that most any depository arrangement is legal if only it serves 
the prevention of bid shopping and bid peddling and shows no 
per se illegal restraints. By Judge Yankwich's own reasoning, a 
close emulation of the Bakersfield system by other groups would 
not necessarily keep such other groups within the boundaries of 
the law. For such other groups would not, at the same time, be 
subject to injunctions, to inspection by the Department of Justice, 
and to a retained jurisdiction in court. Beyond that, different 
courts may have different views of what is, and what is not, justified 
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in the interest of prevention of bid shopping. While the Bakers-
field court heard several witnesses on the "evils" of such practices, 
general experience and the abundant testimony from representa-
tives· of divergent interests before numerous committees of Con-
gress make utterly unacceptable the premise that all dealings 
which some trade circles call bid shopping or bid peddling neces-
sarily are unethical, undesirable, or superfluous. There is good 
evidence that under certain circumstances such dealings are bene-
ficial or even necessary, for instance, in cases of alternate specifi.ca-
tions.112 It cannot be gainsaid that bargaining for price reductions 
is price competition. Adherents to a depository plan must bear 
the burden of showing that it is aimed only at discouraging irre-
sponsible bargaining techniques by reasonable means. 
There are other factors which should be taken into account in 
any particular situation. One is the size and composition of the 
organized group or groups. As the Bakersfield plan illustrates, the 
combination of different specialty contractors in one depository 
may lead to tying arrangements. Another factor is the past behav-
ior of the parties involved. An established proclivity to wrong-
doing is a valid reason for more stringent scrutiny by courts and 
law-enforcing agencies. Yet another factor is the nature and 
structure of the trade involved. A field in which generally there 
is considerable competition will be less restricted by a depository 
than a non-competitive field. Small businesses may be less able 
than larger ones to bear the possible waste of expenditures on esti-
mates; and the average amount of such expenditures will be greater 
in some trades than in other trades. Mechanical specialty contrac-
tors may have better over-all reasons for arranging depositories than 
many other tradesmen. Among those reasons is the fact that, gen-
erally, they comprise relatively small businesses which are faced 
with the usually greater power of general contractors.113 
Depositories should be accessible to all who want to use them. 
No subcontractor or general contractor or owner should be re-
112 Note that even the Bakersfield plan, in rule 10, appears to leave some elbow-room 
for post-bidding negotiati9ns, if only for those who bid on the project in the first instance. 
The 120-day freeze on negotiations there provided is binding only upon contractors who 
did not so bid. For a discussion of reasons against binding general contractors firmly to 
first-round subbids, see Schulz, "The Firm Offer Puzzle," 19 UNIV. Cm. L. REv. 237 at 260 
(1952). 
113 In 1955, the executive vice-president of NECA produced a table listing all me-
chanical specialty contractors, by lines of business and by states, totalling 87,004. That 
table is printed in S. Hearings Before a Subcommittee of the Committee on the Judiciary 
on S. 1644, 84th Cong., 1st sess., pp. 221-222 (1955). The same witness testified, in 1957, that 
there existed more than 15,000 electrical contractors, most of whom do a business of less 
than $250,000 per year. He also testified that approximately an average of 40% of total 
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quired to deal exclusively through the depository, but the choice 
to use it should be open for any given job. Once the path through 
the depository has been taken by anyone, he may be bound to 
follow the depository procedure to the end of that particular job, 
provided that such procedure is not unreasonably restrictive. Fees 
adequate for the maintenance of the depository may be collected. 
Penalties for infractions payable to the depository should be looked 
at askance. Handling of the depository should be left to an agency 
independent of the trades involved. Opening of bids should be 
public and subject to advance notice to interested parties. With-
drawals of bids between opening and submission to general con-
tractors or owners should be permitted only if the bidder can dem-
onstrate an error in compiling the bid. Stipulations against further 
negotiations after the "first-round" bidding should not bind sub-
contractors who did not participate in such bidding on the partic-
ular job at hand. Those who did so participate might be prohibited 
from seeking the use of the depository on the same job, for a very 
limited time. 
The principal sanction on which depositories should rely is 
the force of public opinion, i.e., opinion within the trades in-
volved.114 Interested general and subcontractors may be expected 
to learn eventually why a particular job was not awarded to the 
low bidder through the depository. If the reasons and circum-
stances of the award to some one else were truly reprehensible and 
unethical, the reputation of the offending firms will be damaged. 
By the same token, if there were valid reasons for by-passing the 
lowest bidder through the depository, ethics and reputations will 
not be involved. Since one cannot justly condemn all so-called bid 
peddling and bid shopping, that variable regulation by force of 
informed opinion appears to be best suited to the problem. The 
legitimate purpose o~ such depositories would be frustrated, of 
course, if the publication of subbids were used for testing compli-
ance with an illegal scheme for fixing prices, rotating bids, or other-
wise violating the law. If anyone suffers discrimination because he 
deviated from such a scheme, he should have recourse to law en-
forcing agencies. 
construction costs, at least on federal jobs, are accounted for by costs of mechanical spe-
cialty work. H. Hearings Before Subcommittee No. 2 of the Committee on the Judiciary 
on H.R. 3241, etc., 85th Cong., 1st sess., pp. 25-26 (1957). 
114 The executive vice-president of NECA testified in Joint Hearing Before the Sub-
committees of the Committees on the Judiciary on S. 848 and Similar House Bills, 83d 
Cong., 1st sess., p. 28 (1953): "The contractors and subcohtractors involved are subject to 
the force of public opinion on private work where the contractor a:qd subcontractor usually 
move in the same business circles." 
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1940) 
------U.S. v. Marble Contractors' Assn. (Clv, No, 805, 
W.D. Pa, 1940) 
500 1940-1943 Trade X 
Cas, '1!56,020 - --U.S. v. Pittsburgh Tile and Mantel Contractors' 501 1940-1943 Trade X 
Assn, (Clv, No. 806, W.D. Pa. 1940) Cas, '1!56,021 ------U.S. v. Mason Contractors' Assn, of the District 504 1940-1943 Trade X 
of Columbia (Civ. No. 6169, D.C.D,C, 1940) Cas, '1!56,015 ----U. S, v. Harbor District Lumber Dealers Assn, 506 and 1940-1943 Trade X X X 
(Civ. No, 1401-Y, Crim, No. 14302-H, S,D. 590 Cas, '1!56,110 
Cal, 1940) 
U. S. v. Empl~ing Plasterers' Assn. of Alie- 507 1940-1943 Trade X 
gheny County ( iv. No. 840, W.D. Pa. 1940) Cas, '1!56,025 
U.S. v. Brooker Engineering Co. (Civ. No. 3146, 508 and 
Crim, No. 25,692, E.D. Mich, 1940, 1942) 679 
1940-1943 Trade X X X 
Cas, '1!56,183 ------U.S. v. Associated Plumbing and Heating Mer-
chants (Crim. No. 45270, W,D, Wash, 1940) 
518 38 F. Supp, 769 X 
U.S. v. Tile Contractors' Assn. of America, Inc, 533 1940-1943 Trade X 
(Civ. No. 1761, N.D, Ill. 1940) Cas, '1!56,044 ----U.S. v. Associated Marble Companies (Civ. No, 537 and 1940-1943 Trade X X X 
21848-L, Crim, No. 26976-L, N.D. Cal, 1940, 604 Cas, '1!56,136 
1941) 
U.S. v, St. Louis Tile Contractors' Assn, (Civ. 543 and 3 Trade Reg. X X 
No. 521-2, Crim, No. 21552, E.D, Mo, 1940) 526 Rep, (8th ed,) 
'1!15,096 --U.S. v. Detroit Tile Contractors' Assn, (Civ. 545 1940-1943 Trade X X 
No. 1962, E.D, Mich. 1940) Cas, '1!56,053 
U.S. v, Northeast Texas Chapter, NECA (Crim, 919 1950-1951 Trade X X 
No. 11952, N.D, Texas 1949) Cas. 1162,596; 
181 F, (2d) 30 ------
U.S. v, Reno Merchant Plumbing and Heatln' 1027 1952-1953 Trade X X 
Contractors, Inc, (Civ, No. 868, D.C, Nev, 1952 Cas, '1!67,361 ----U.S. v. Las Vegas Merchant Plumbers Assn. 1070 and 1955 Trade Cas. X X 
(Crim, No.12173, Clv, No. 939, D,C, Nev.1951) 1080 1168,024; 210 F. 
(2d) 732, cert. 
den, 348 U.S. 
817 
*Customers signifies general contractors, owners or awarding authorities. 
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U.S. v. Detroit Sheet Metal and Roofing Con- 1149 and 1955 Trade Cas, X X X X 
tractors Assn., Inc, (Clv. No, 12433, Crim, No, 1153 '1167,986; 
33452, E,D. Mich. 1955, 1953) 1953 Trade Cas. 
'1167,596 ----------------
U.S. v. Bakersfield Associated Plumbing Con- 1242 1958 Trade Cas. X X X 
tractors, Inc, (Civ. No, 1479-N.D, S,D, Cal. 1958) '1169,087 and 
1959 Trade Cas, 
'1169,266 ------------
U.S. v. Arizona Consolidated Masonry and 1449 and X X X X 
Plastering Contractors' Assn. (Clv. No. 3066- 1450 
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